

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 4, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED BY  
MINISTER SEMENOV, FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 4, 1973

THE USSR DELEGATION WILL STUDY THE STATEMENT  
MADE BY THE U. S. DELEGATION TODAY WITH ALL THE ATTENTION  
IT DESERVES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SOME THOUGHTS IN CONNEC-  
TION WITH THE RESUMPTION OF OUR WORK.

WHILE AT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE GENEVA STAGE OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FALL OF LAST YEAR THE DELEGATIONS OUT-  
LINED A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVES GIVEN US, AND  
WHILE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THAT PHASE WAS OF A PRELIMINARY  
NATURE, THE TASK AT THE CURRENT PHASE IS TO CONSIDER  
PROBLEMS IN SUBSTANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VIII OF  
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THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT WAS PRECISELY THIS OBJECTIVE THAT GUIDED THE SOVIET SIDE IN ALL THE WORK PRIOR TO THE INFORMAL RECESS. PROGRESS IN THE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD CLEARLY BE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE.

ON APRIL 6, 1973 THE SOVIET SIDE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT CONTAINS CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON A BROAD RANGE OF PROBLEMS BEFORE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INDICATES WAYS FOR FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THEM, IN ALL THEIR TOTALITY AS WELL AS FOR INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS. IT DEFINES AN APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CONSIDERS QUESTIONS RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF WEAPONS, BOTH THOSE WHICH ARE COVERED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THOSE WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN IT, AND PROPOSES MEASURES FOR FURTHER DURING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS DRAWN UP WITH ACCOUNT FOR THE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U. S. IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVIOUS STAGE OF SOVIET- AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS. IT ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROVISIONS PROPOSED IN THE DOCUMENT TABLED ARE BASED ON STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS PRINCIPLE, WHICH FOUND ITS EXPRESSION IN THE SOVIET- AMERICAN DOCUMENTS OF MAY 1972, IS MOST IMPORTANT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. UNSWERVING OBSERVANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE IN RESPECT TO ALL ASPECTS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS A GUARANTEE FOR ENSURING THE MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS UNDER DISCUSSION, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY.

AS YOU KNOW, ON APRIL 12, 1973 THE SOVIET SIDE SUBMITTED A NEW PROPOSAL ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES, PROVIDING FOR A PHASED SOLUTION OF

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THIS QUESTION. IN SUBMITTING THIS PROPOSAL THE SOVIET SIDE WAS GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO OVERCOME EXISTING DIFFICULTIES AND TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE USSR IS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT OPENS PRACTICAL AVENUES FOR FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

THE COMPLEX OF PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE  
AT THE CURRENT GENEVA PHASE ENCOMPASSES THE WHOLE RANGE  
OF PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND MAKES  
IT POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN TERMS OF AN ACTIVE  
CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS IN SUBSTANCE.

JUST AS IN THE PAST, THE USSR DELEGATION IS PREPARED  
TO CONDUCT THE DISCUSSIONS IN A BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
SPIRIT.

IN RESUMING OUR DISCUSSIONS WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE  
ONCE AGAIN THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
ATTACHES TO THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON  
LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS. WITH MANIFESTATIONS OF REALISM AND  
UNSWERVING EFFORTS TO EMBODY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY  
AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, ONE MAY HOPE FOR  
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

EXEMPT-3. JOHNSON

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